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Casenotes
LANCE ARMSTRONG WINS AGAIN BY SURVIVING A
LAWSUIT FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS AND FRAUD
WITHOUT SO MUCH AS A “SLAPP”
ON THE WRIST
“I know the truth. The truth isn’t what was out there.  The
trust isn’t what I said, and now it’s gone—this story was so
perfect for so long . . . . it’s just this mythic perfect story,
and it wasn’t true.”1
– Lance Armstrong
I. INTRODUCTION: HOW LIVESTRONG TURNED INTO LIVING A LIE
In January 2013, Lance Armstrong shocked the world when he
admitted he used performance-enhancing drugs to win the Tour de
France an unprecedented seven times.2  Armstrong’s admissions
devastated many fans, as the once-admired athlete and cancer-survi-
vor feverishly claimed for over a decade that any allegations of his
1. Oprah and Lance Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive Interview (Oprah Winfrey
Network television broadcast Jan. 17, 2013) (hereinafter “Oprah and Lance”) (cap-
turing Lance Armstrong’s first public admission to using performance enhance-
ment drugs).  Part I of the interview is available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=e_-yfFIiDao. Part II of the interview is available at https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=6RxdHU5W3Lc. See also Lance Armstrong & Oprah Winfrey: Interview
Transcript, BBC.COM, Jan. 18, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/cycling/
21065539 (reporting transcript of Oprah Winfrey’s interview with Lance
Armstrong).
2. See Oprah and Lance, supra note 1 (discussing Lance Armstrong’s perform-
ance-enhancing drug use). The allegations of drug use or “doping” among the
professional cycling circuit were so widespread that, in 2012, the New York Times
reported that only two Tour de France winners since 1995 have not been involved
in controversial doping allegations. See Ian Austen, 2010 Tour de France Winner
Found Guilty of Doping, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at B13, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/sports/cycling/alberto-contador-found-guilty-of-dop-
ing.html?_r=0  (explaining that investigation results stripped fellow professional
cyclist Alberto Contador of his 2010 Tour de France title and 12 other wins was not
only cyclist to be accused of drug use).  Nonetheless, people were truly dismayed to
learn that Armstrong too had taken part in the doping scheme. See Bill Strickland,
Lance Armstrong’s Endgame, BICYCLING MAG. (May 2013), http://www.bicycling
.com/news/pro-cycling/lance-armstrongs-endgame (describing personal relation-
ship with Armstrong and personally stating the following: “Accepting that Lance
cheated makes me want to cry.  A 46-year-old guy.  Can you imagine that?”).
(109)
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drug use were false.3  In his attempt to save his own image and the
image of his cancer foundation, Livestrong, Lance Armstrong pub-
licly destroyed private relationships with former teammates and
friends who confirmed allegations.4  Armstrong, an inspiration to
cancer survivors and recreational cyclists, among others, left people
“bitterly angry” and dismayed when he revealed the truth.5
Even though Armstrong was banned from competitions and
stripped of his Tour titles and glory, some consumers felt this pun-
ishment was not enough.6  Armstrong authored several bestsellers,
including It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life, and Every
3. See Juliet Marcur, On a Big Stage, a Tired Act, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/sports/cycling/on-a-big-stage-a-tired-act
.html?ref=lancearmstrong&_r=0 (describing Armstrong interview and alleging in-
terview did little to salvage reputation).  New York Times writer Juliet Marcur, who
also personally knew Armstrong, summarizes the betrayal that people felt after
Armstrong’s interview with Oprah Winfrey: “Armstrong failed to offer his fans what
they were seeking: genuine contrition.  For a few minutes here and there, he
seemed sorry, but only about being caught.” See id. (discussing fans’ reaction to
Armstrong’s interview with Oprah Winfrey and suggesting Armstrong did not re-
gret using performance enhancing drugs).  But see Eun Kyung Kim, Three Cups’
Author Greg Mortenson: ‘I let a lot of people down’, USA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2014), http://
www.today.com/books/three-cups-author-greg-mortenson-i-let-lot-people-down-
2D11961320 (describing Mortenson’s apology and gratitude to CBS and Jon
Krakauer for breaking the story because “had they not brought up these issues, we
could have gotten into more serious problems”).
4. See Emmanuella Grinberg, Livestrong Bracelet: To Wear or Not to Wear?, CNN
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/living/lance-armstrong-lives-
trong-legacy/ (describing backlash from supporters of Armstrong’s foundation,
Livestrong).  Armstrong’s cancer foundation, Livestrong, was hugely successful
due to the yellow Livestrong bracelet campaign. See id. Although criticized for
using the foundation as a shield against his doping allegations, supporters “bought
bracelets for more strength, for unity, and suddenly Lance wasn’t just an athlete
any longer . . . .  Lance [was] Livestrong, he [was] the face of hope.” See id. (dis-
cussing fans of Armstrong and his Livestrong foundation and their admiration for
Armstrong ).  Nonetheless, the charity continues to acknowledge its founder, al-
though he is no longer a board member. See generally LIVESTRONG FOUNDATION,
LIVESTRONG.ORG, http://www.livestrong.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).  Arm-
strong also reportedly filed various frivolous defamation suits against those who
confirmed the allegations, despite later recanting his story. See Debra Cassens
Weiss, Was Lance Armstrong a Lawsuit Bully? Cyclist Admits ‘Major Flaw’, ABA J. (Jan.
18, 2013, 12:38 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lance_armstrong_
admits_to_lawsuit_bullying/ (discussing briefly Armstrong’s lawsuits).
5. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129204, at *10 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 2013) (describing allegations against de-
fendants). See also Marcur, supra note 3. Marcur, who knows Lance Armstrong
personally, called Armstrong an “Oscar-winning liar” and notes that “he was the
guy who said that he would never do anything to jeopardize the faith that millions
of people had in him as their inspiration to fight cancer.” See id.
6. See, e.g., Lance Armstrong Sued for Fraud Over Memoirs, CBSNEWS.COM (Jan. 24,
2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lance-armstrong-sued-for-fraud-
over-memoirs/ (describing lawsuit over books).  Lance Armstrong was also report-
edly sued for fraud in connection with the energy drinks he endorsed. See Brent
Schrotenboer, Lance Armstrong Wins Endorsement Lawsuit, USA TODAY (Feb. 26,
2
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Second Counts, both of which became the center of controversy in
Stutzman v. Armstrong in 2013.7  In Stutzman, several California re-
sidents brought a class action consumer suit against Armstrong, his
management team, and book publishers for misrepresenting the
books as autobiographies because Armstrong maintained through-
out both books that he never used performance-enhancing drugs.8
The plaintiffs asserted they would not have purchased the books if
they had known the truth about the books’ contents.9  This is not
the first time that a high-profile author has been brought to court
for fraud claims relating to his books.10  Both James Frey, author of
A Million Little Pieces, and Greg Mortenson, author of Three Cups of
2014, 6:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/cycling/2014/02/26/
lance-armstrong-frs-false-advertising-ruling/5840623/.
7. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *5-6 (“According to Plain-
tiffs, the success of Every Second Counts and It’s Not About the Bike permitted Arm-
strong to publish and sell, and thereby profit from, the other three books at
issue.”). See also First Amended Complaint at 5-6, Stutzman v. Armstrong, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN) [herein-
after First Amended Complaint] (alleging success of later books was founded on
bestseller status of earlier books).  As noted by the plaintiffs, It’s Not About the Bike
was a New York Times number-one bestseller, spending twenty-four weeks on
hardcover list, and twenty-two weeks on the paperback list. See id. at para. 4, at 5-6
(describing success of Armstrong’s books). Compare LANCE ARMSTRONG & SALLY
JENKINS, IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BIKE: MY JOURNEY BACK TO LIFE (2000) (telling auto-
biographical story of Armstrong’s cycling career and personal life) with LANCE ARM-
STRONG & SALLY JENKINS, EVERY SECOND COUNTS (2003) (telling autobiographical
story of Armstrong’s life following first book).
8. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 7, at 27 (describing false content
of books).  For example, the plaintiffs quoted a portion of Armstrong’s first book,
It’s Not About the Bike, where he repeatedly denied any use of performance enhanc-
ing drugs. See id. The brief quoted Armstrong as stating the following in his
book:Doping is an unfortunate fact of life in cycling . . . .  Inevitably, some teams
and riders feel . . . they have to [dope] to stay competitive with the peloton.  I
never felt that way, and certainly after chemo[therapy] the idea of putting any-
thing foreign in my body was especially repulsive.
See id. (fourth alteration in original). Despite the fact that Armstrong repeat-
edly made such statements, plaintiffs alleged that the books continued to be mar-
keted as biography, even though the publishers and his management team should
have known the truth about their misrepresentations. See id. at 60-61 (explaining
how each defendant was responsible for fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation).
9. See id. at 3-4 (“Plaintiffs [allege they] . . . would not have purchased . . . [or]
paid as much money for the Armstrong Books had they known the true facts con-
cerning . . . his [later] admitted involvement in a sports doping scandal that has
led to his recent . . . public exposure and fall from glory.”).
10. See Lance Armstrong Sued for Fraud Over Memoirs, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lance-armstrong-sued-for-fraud-over-memoirs/
(describing similar suits brought against Frey and Mortenson).  For a discussion of
how these lawsuits played out in court, see infra notes 127-130 and accompanying R
text.
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Tea, made headlines when they were sued over misrepresentations
made in their respective memoirs.11
Despite the fact that both of Armstrong’s books and their ad-
vertisements clearly contained false statements, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California found in favor of
Armstrong and his fellow defendants.12  Not only were the claims
found to chill the defendants’ right to free speech, but the defend-
ants also had a powerful law on their side—California’s Anti-SLAPP
motion.13  This special motion to strike may be employed by a de-
fendant in response to a Strategic Lawsuit against Public Participa-
tion, more commonly referred to as a SLAPP, which is a suit that is
simply brought to chill one’s right to free speech.14  The purpose of
the Anti-SLAPP statute in California is to “protect[ ] a citizen’s
rights of petition and free speech from the chilling effect of expen-
sive retaliatory lawsuits brought against them for speaking out.”15
11. See generally Daniel Fisher, A Million Little Lawsuits over Frey Book?, FORBES
MAG. (Jan. 30, 2006, 7:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2006/01/30/frey-book-
lawsuit-cz_df_0130autofacescan13.html (explaining lawsuit against Frey over
book); Matt Volz, Judge Throws Out Lawsuit Against “Three Cups of Tea” Author, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 30, 2012,1:41 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/30/
11474825-judge-throws-out-lawsuit-against-three-cups-of-tea-author?lite (explaining
result in Mortenson case). Compare JAMES FREY, A MILLION LITTLE PIECES (2003)
(telling story based on author’s life of struggles with drug additions and rehabilita-
tion) with GREG MORTENSON & DAVID OLIVER RELIN, THREE CUPS OF TEA (2006)
(telling story of humanitarian efforts).
12. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *64-65 (granting defend-
ants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike on all counts).  The court granted plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint pursuant to Anti-SLAPP motion procedures, which
did not make defendants an immediately prevailing party. See id. at *65 (citing
Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad Commications Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[G]ranting a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiff’s initial com-
plaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend would directly collide with
Fed. R. of Civ. P. 15(a)’s policy favoring liberal amendment.”). See also id. at *65
(“However, when a plaintiff is granted leave to amend the complaint, a defendant
whose anti-SLAPP motion is granted is not a ‘prevailing party’ for the purposes of
the anti-SLAPP statutory framework.” (citing Thornbrough v. W. Placer Unified
Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-CV-02613-GEB, 2010 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 90173 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
2010))).  However, in October 2013, plaintiffs filed notice to dismiss their com-
plaint. See Rule 41(a)(1) Notice of Dismissal with Prejudice, Stutzman v. Arm-
strong, , 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-00116-
MCE-KJN) (indicating notice of dismissal with prejudice of claims).
13. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *14 (explaining why anti-
SLAPP statute protected defendants in case).  For a discussion about the back-
ground of this law, see infra notes 69-109 and accompanying text. R
14. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 et seq. (Deering 2011) (providing proce-
dures for special motion to strike arising from actions in furtherance of free
speech rights).  For a discussion of these statutes, see infra notes 69-109 and accom- R
panying text.
15. Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) Law: Restrictions on
Use of Special Motion to Strike: Bill Analysis Hearing before the Senate Committee on Judici-
ary, 2003 (Ca. 2003) reprinted in 2003 Legis. Bill Hist. CA S.B. 515 [hereinafter Bill
4
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In order to survive the motion, plaintiffs must prove a likelihood of
success on their claims, which the plaintiffs in Stutzman could not
do.16
Although the court’s Anti-SLAPP analysis properly exposed the
meritless nature of the suit, the outcome is notable for two primary
reasons.17  First, while the claims against the defendants qualified as
a SLAPP, the use in this instance contradicts the original purpose of
the motion—to protect the underdog from a more powerful party
simply seeking to silence them.18  This highlights an important
point about the direction SLAPP laws are moving.19  Second, while
the threat of chilling free speech is recognizable, this decision fur-
ther limits the recourse available to consumers who rely on mislead-
ing advertisements of books.20  Ultimately, the court chose the
more compelling policy argument in favor of free speech.21
Analysis Hearing], available at  ftp://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_0501-
0550/sb_515_cfa_20030507_133358_sen_comm.html (description of original pur-
pose of Anti-SLAPP motion by Consumer Attorneys of California).
16. Accord Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204 at *64-65, *67 (“Plaintiffs
may file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this
Memorandum and Order.  If no amended complaint is filed, the causes of action
stricken by this Order shall be dismissed with prejudice without further notice to
the parties.”).  For an explanation of why the judge granted leave in this case, see
infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.  As of October 2013, all plaintiffs dis-
missed with prejudice all of their respective claims in the action against defendants
pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). See Rule 41(a)(1) No-
tice of Dismissal with Prejudice, Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-cv-00116-MCE-
KJN, 2013 US. Dist. LEXIS 129204 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (providing notice of
dismissal).
17. See infra notes 134-199 and accompanying text. (explaining why case was R
deemed meritless). See also Jonathan Turley, Court Declares Armstrong has Protected
Right to Lie, RES IPSA LOQUITUR BLOG (Sept. 12, 2013), http://jonathanturley.org/
2013/09/12/court-declares-armstrong-has-protected-right-to-lie-to-fans/ (claiming
that lawsuit against Armstrong was certainly meritless).
18. See infra notes 69-109 (discussing typical use of anti-SLAPP statutes). See R
generally Jerome I. Braun, Article: Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of
Petition in California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 970 (1999). But see FAQs About
SLAPPS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT,  http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-
free-speech-protection/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013) (asserting that anybody can be
subject to SLAPP).
19. See infra notes 216-233 and accompanying text (discussing notable out- R
come of case).
20. See infra notes 216-233 any accompanying text (discussing impact of case R
on future litigation).
21. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129204, at *64 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 9,. 2013) (“[A]lthough Plaintiffs assert the
public interest in this case weighs in favor of protecting consumers from books that
contain false statements, the case law makes clear that the public interest . . . [fa-
vors] free speech”). But see Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th
1220 (1999) (holding that advertisements on book jackets were commercial
speech and less protected).  For a discussion on how Keimer fits in the commercial
5
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This Note examines the fraud case, Stutzman v. Armstrong,
brought against Lance Armstrong, his management team, and pub-
lishers for the misleading nature of his “autobiographies.”22  Part II
tells the story of Lance Armstrong’s downfall, and what led these
plaintiffs to seek recourse in court.23  Part III explains the various
laws at play in this case, including California’s Consumer Protection
Statutes, Anti-SLAPP procedures, First Amendment principles, and
the strong policy arguments at the heart of these laws.24  Parts IV
and V examine the court’s analysis of these issues and expose both
the strengths and shortcomings of the opinion.25  Finally, Part VI
discusses how Stutzman may impact future litigation involving mis-
leading advertisements of protected speech and where anti-SLAPP
laws are headed.26
II. FACTS: LANCE ARMSTRONG AND THE TOO GOOD
TO BE TRUE STORY
In 1991, at only nineteen years old, Armstrong was already
climbing the road to stardom as an amateur cyclist who was pre-
dicted to “certainly leave an impression.”27  In 1996, Armstrong sur-
vived a battle against testicular cancer only to make an impressive
comeback to cycling.28  This prediction continued to prove true
when Armstrong won an unprecedented seven consecutive Tour de
France titles in 1999 through 2005.29  His incredible story led to the
publication of several autobiographical and training books, includ-
doctrine jurisprudence and how the Stutzman court disregarded it, see infra notes
128-39 and accompanying text.
22. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:12 – CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19204 (E.D. Cal.,  Sept. 9, 2013) (examining allegations of
misrepresentation).
23. For a discussion of the circumstances leading to the Stutzman case, see
infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the laws and background in Stutzman, see infra notes
47-133 and accompanying text.
25. For an explanation of the court’s analysis in Stutzman, see infra notes 134-
215 and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of what role this case may play in future litigation, see
infra notes 217-233 and accompanying text.
27. See Frank Litsky, CYCLING: Armstrong May Not Win, But Watch This Space,
N.Y.TIMES.COM (May 13, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/13/sports/cy-
cling-armstrong-may-not-win-but-watch-this-space.html?ref=lancearmstrong (dis-
cussing early cycling career of Lance Armstrong).
28. See Lance Armstrong: Biography, THE BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL http://www.biog-
raphy.com/people/lance-armstrong-9188901?page=2 (last visited Mar. 3, 2014)
(discussing bout with testicular cancer).
29. See generally BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, supra note 28 (describing life of Lance
Armstrong).  The Tour de France is a grueling eleven-day race totaling 1,085 miles
across the mountainous terrain of France. See id. (describing Tour de France).
6
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ing It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life, published in 2000,
and Every Second Counts, published in 2003, both of which became
New York Times Bestsellers.30
Beginning around 1999 and continuing for ten years, the
United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) continually specu-
lated that Armstrong, like many of his fellow cyclists on the profes-
sional circuit, was using performance-enhancing drugs.31  Despite
fervent denials, in 2012, several of Armstrong’s former teammates
testified to his drug use when USADA brought formal charges
against him.32  As a result of the damning testimony, emails, lab
tests, and other evidence, USADA and the International Cycling
Union stripped Armstrong of his seven Tour titles and the other
awards he won between 1999 and 2005.33  Even after losing his ti-
tles, Armstrong continued to deny the charges brought against him
and even filed defamation claims against some of the people he
thought betrayed him.34  Finally, in a January 2013 interview with
30. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204 at *5-8 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (describing books at issue in suit). Compare LANCE ARMSTRONG
& SALLY JENKINS, IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BIKE: MY JOURNEY BACK TO LIFE (2000) (tell-
ing autobiographical story of cycling career and personal life) with LANCE ARM-
STRONG & SALLY JENKINS, EVERY SECOND COUNTS (2003) (telling autobiographical
story of Armstrong’s life following first book).
See generally, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, It’s All About the First Amendment: Lance
Armstrong Wins Dismissal in False Ad Suit Over Books, LEXOLOGY: ASS’N OF CORPORATE
COUNSEL (Sept. 26, 2013) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=89c803
70-f605-4443-aa91-00550beeff77 (describing outcome of suit against Lance Arm-
strong, agents, and publishers).
31. See Statement from USADA CEO Travis T. Tygart Regarding The U.S. Postal
Service Pro Cycling Team Doping Conspiracy, USADA U.S. POSTAL SERVICE TEAM PRO
CYCLING INVESTIGATION (Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://cyclinginvestiga-
tion.usada.org/ (making statement regarding decisions to press charges against
Armstrong).
32. See BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, supra note 28 (describing allegations against
teammates and Armstrong related to performance enhancing drugs). See also Ju-
liet Macur, Armstrong Seemingly Readies for Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/sports/cycling/armstrong-seemingly-readies-for-
new-doping-fight.html?ref=lancearmstrong&_r=0 (discussing charges brought by
USADA against Armstrong).  Armstrong was accused of using and distributing vari-
ous steroids and “cocktail of banned performance-enhancing drugs, including the
blood booster EPO, testosterone and human growth hormone.” See id.
33. See BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, supra note 28 (declaring results of Armstrong’s
misconduct).
34. Accord Krishnadev Calamur, Lance Armstrong Admits to Using Performance-
Enhancing Drugs, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 17, 2013, 8:24 PM), http://www
.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/01/17/169650077/lance-armstrong-to-admit-to-
using-performance-enhancing-drugs (describing confessions to drug use in famed
Winfrey interview).  Armstrong, in addition to public denials, also brought defama-
tion suits against his former teammates and others that truthfully alleged that he
used performance-enhancing drugs. See id.
7
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Oprah Winfrey, Armstrong publically admitted to using various per-
formance-enhancing drugs beginning in the mid-1990s.35
Following Armstrong’s public admission, California residents
Rob Stutzman, Jonathan Wheeler, Gloria Lauria, David Reimers,
and Scott Armstrong brought a class action suit on January 22, 2013
regarding Armstrong’s alleged autobiographies.36  Both books, ad-
vertised as truthful retellings of his life and career, included Arm-
strong’s repeated denials of his drug use.37  Besides Armstrong,
plaintiffs also named William J. Stapelton, Thomas Weisel, and pub-
lishers Penguin Group and Random House as defendants.38  The
plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated the California Consumer
Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), The Unfair Competition Law
(“UCL”) and the False Advertising Law (“FAL”), through acts of
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit.39
The plaintiffs alleged that Armstrong’s two autobiographies,
It’s Not About the Bike: My Journey Back to Life and Every Second Counts,
were advertised and represented as “truthful and honest works of
nonfiction biography when, in fact, Defendants knew or should
35. See Oprah Interview supra note 1 (announcing use of performance-enhanc-
ing drugs).
36. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *2-3 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (describing plaintiffs).  Rob Stutzman is reportedly a public
relations executive who was deputy chief of staff for former governor of California,
Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Jonathan Wheeler is an amateur cyclist. See Alison
Frankel, Lance Armstrong Sued for Fraud Over Book Fabrications, REUTERS (Jan. 23,
2013, 9:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/us-usa-armstrong-
lawsuit-idUSBRE90N02V20130124 (explaining plaintiffs in suit).  Plaintiff Gloria
Lauria suffered from breast cancer at the time the suit was filed. See Stutzman, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *9-10 (describing plaintiffs’ personal claims).
37. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 7, para. 41, at 27 (describing
false content of books).  For example, plaintiffs quoted a portion of Armstrong’s
first book, It’s Not About the Bike, where he repeatedly denied any use of perform-
ance enhancing drugs. See id. Plaintiff’s quoted Armstrong as writing the follow-
ing statement:Doping is an unfortunate fact of life in cycling . . . Inevitably, some
teams and riders feel . . . they have to [dope] to stay competitive within the
peloton.  I never felt that way, and certainly after chemo[therapy] the idea of put-
ting anything foreign in my body was especially repulsive.
Id. (fourth alteration in original) (citing LANCE ARMSTRONG & SALLY JENKINS, ITS
NOT ABOUT THE BIKE: A JOURNEY BACK TO LIFE (2000)). Despite the fact that Arm-
strong repeatedly made such statements, plaintiffs alleged that the books contin-
ued to be marketed as biographical, even though publishers and his management
team should have known the truth about their misrepresentations. See id. paras.
94-97, at 60-61 (explaining how each defendant was responsible for fraudulent or
negligent misrepresentation).
38. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *7 (discussing named de-
fendants).  Plaintiffs named Stapleton, Armstrong’s agent and manager, and Wei-
sel, his cycling team owner and financier, because they were both integral in
creating the “Lance Armstrong ‘brand.’” See id.
39. See id. (stating claims made by plaintiffs).  For a discussion of the Califor-
nia’s consumer protection laws, see supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
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have known that these books were works of fiction containing false
and misleading statements.”40  Plaintiffs, ranging from recreational
cyclists to cancer survivors, claimed they were misled by the inspir-
ing story and would not have purchased or paid as much for the
books had they known the truth about the contents.41
Additionally, plaintiffs claimed defendants neither took action
to discover nor correct their misrepresentations regarding the
books, even after Armstrong admitted to doping.42  Specifically,
plaintiffs claimed defendants failed or avoided to conduct investiga-
tions into the merits of the doping charges, publish corrective no-
tices after the interview and offer refunds, but instead, continued to
sell the books with same promotional materials despite Armstrong’s
confession.43  The defendants’ “multi-faceted scheme to defraud
the plaintiffs,” as plaintiffs claimed, led to the financial success of
Armstrong’s books published after the two autobiographies at is-
sue.44  Likewise, the plaintiffs accused Stapleton and Weisel of con-
spiring to the actions by building the “Armstrong brand” and
concealing his doping to maintain his image.45  The defendants,
however, prevailed by using California’s Anti-SLAPP statute to win a
successful motion to strike the plaintiffs’ claims because they chil-
led the defendants’ free speech rights.46
40. See id. at *6 (internal citations omitted) (summarizing plaintiffs’ argu-
ments). See LANCE ARMSTRONG & SALLY JENKINS, IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BIKE: MY
JOURNEY BACK TO LIFE (2000) (telling autobiographical story of cycling career and
personal life); LANCE ARMSTRONG & SALLY JENKINS, EVERY SECOND COUNTS (2003)
(telling autobiographical story of Armstrong’s life following first book).
41. See id. Stutzman and Wheeler both testified that they read and recom-
mended the books after learning about Armstrong’s “inspiring account of his tri-
umphant return [to cycling.]” See id. Similarly, Lauria, a cancer survivor, was
“bitterly angry” upon finding out that Armstrong’s books were untrue, and that she
would not have purchased the books had she known the truth. See id. at *10.  See
also Frankel, supra note 36 (explaining plaintiffs in suit).
42. See id. at *2 (discussing claims that Defendants should have proactively
discovered and corrected error).
43. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 7, para. 36, at 23 (arguing mis-
representations by publishers). But see Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204 at
*57 (acknowledging precedent noting that publishers owe no duty to fact check or
verify truthfulness of nonfiction books or memoirs).
44. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204 at *60-61 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (explaining allegations of defendants Stapleton’s and Weisman’s
actions).
45. See id. at *60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining involvement
of defendants).
46. See id. at *64-65 (stating conclusion and holding).
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III. BACKGROUND: WHERE FREE SPEECH AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION INTERSECT
A. California Consumer Protection Laws
California has multiple consumer protection laws that seek to
protect consumers from unfair or deceptive trade practices.47  In
fact, California was the first state to contemplate adoption of the
National Consumer Act, the uniform code designed to level the
playing field between consumers and industry.48  As an early leader
in consumer protection, California’s laws evolved into one of the
more useful systems for consumers because of the selection of
claims available.49  Today, consumers frequently allege violations
under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition Law,
and False Advertising Law together because of their close relation
to one another.50
The CLRA is purposed to “protect consumers against unfair
and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and eco-
nomical procedures to secure such protection.”51  The CLRA pro-
vides a consumer who suffers damages from a seller’s unfair
methods in a transaction or sale of goods or services with the option
to bring a class action or individual suit to obtain a broad range of
damages.52  The CLRA does have a comparatively limited scope,
47. See generally Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State
Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CENTER
(Feb. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf (re-
vealing strengths and weaknesses in state consumer protection laws).  The Na-
tional Consumer Law Center, a non-profit that provides advocacy and treatises on
consumer law, is critical of California consumer statutes, but does describe their
laws as comparatively strong. See id. at 24 (stating mission and purpose).
48. See generally ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW SECTION, THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIS, CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW REVISED
EDITION, § 19.02 (Cheryl Lee Johnson, ed., Matthew Bender & Co., 2014) [herein-
after CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST] (explaining history and origin of California Con-
sumer Legal Remedies Act).  Here, plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief
in response to the “multifaceted scheme to defraud unsuspecting consumers” that
plaintiffs claim defendants employed. See also First Amended Complaint, supra
note 7, para. 35, at 22-23 (describing alleged wrongdoing and relief sought).
49. See generally CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST, supra note 48, (explaining history and
origin of California Consumer Legal Remedies Act).
50. See CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST, supra note 48, §§ 19.04 - 19.10 (explaining
scope, remedies, similarities and differences between California consumer laws).
51. See 13-127 California Forms of Pleading and Practice—Annotated §127.14
(2013) (citing Cal Civ. Code §1750 et seq.) (explaining basic purpose and reme-
dies under CLRA).
52. See id. (explaining methodology for bringing claim under CLRA). See also
Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d) (stating remedies under CLRA).
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however, as it prohibits twenty-four specific categories of deceptive
activities.53
Similarly, a person may sue under California’s FAL, which per-
mits lawsuits when a seller presents an untrue or misleading adver-
tisement that the seller knew, or reasonably should have known, is
misleading.54  Thus, it has a broader reach than the CLRA, as the
FAL does not list certain prohibited activities.55  Stemming from an
early twentieth century movement to protect consumers from un-
scrupulous business practices, the FAL was designed for use when
other common law fraud theories are insufficient.56  As a remedy,
the FAL entitles misled consumers to injunctive relief or damages.57
A person who brings a claim under the FAL, “also has a cause
of action for injunctive and other equitable relief” under the
UCL.58  The UCL contains a broad prohibition against “any unlaw-
ful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, decep-
tive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by
[the FAL].”59  As originally drafted, the broad language meant that
any person, not only persons who could prove they suffered an in-
jury, could sue under the UCL.60  This led to a 2004 reform to curb
the amount of frivolous lawsuits that were attributed to the overly
53. See generally CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST, supra note 48 (explaining comparisons
and differences between statutes) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d); Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210).
54. See 1-2 California White Collar Crime and Business Litigation Sec. 3.2 (2013)
(citing Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500) (describing history, purpose, and constitution-
ality of FAL).
55. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST, supra note 48, at § 19.02  (explaining com-
parisons and differences between statutes) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d); Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.).
56. See id. (discussing history of California False Advertising Act). The model
statute for false advertising, the “Printer’s Ink statute” originally did not contain a
requirement for proof on intention to defraud or reliance, as the difficulty of prov-
ing these requirements were why common law fraud claims were largely too diffi-
cult to prove in the context of advertising. See id. § 17.02 (discussing origins of
elements of offense of false advertising). However, California’s version of the FAL
today does have such a requirement. See id. (citing Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500)
(requiring that misleading advertisement be “known, or which by the exercise of
reasonably care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.”).
57. See 1-2 California White Collar Crime and Business Litigation Sec. 3.2 (2013)
(describing history, purpose, and constitutionality of FAL and discussing remedies
and scope of statute (citing Bus. & Prof.  Code, §§ 17200-17210)).
58. See 1-14 California Points & Authorities § 14.05 (2013) (citing Bus. & Prof.
Code § 17200 et seq.) (stating causes of action and describing statutory action for
UCL).
59. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200  (providing cause of action and relief).
60. See generally H. Scott Leviant, Unintended Consequences: How the Passage of
Ballot Proposition 64 May Increase the Number of Successful Wage and Hour Class Actions
in California, 6 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 18 (2006), available at http://blj.ucdavis.edu/
archives/vol-6-no-2/Unintended-Consequences.html#_ftn3 (explaining how ballot
11
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broad language.61  Nonetheless, like the FAL, the UCL still has rela-
tively broad language to provide for more widespread application
than the CLRA.62
B. Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation
Although California has consumer statutes specifically enacted
for use when traditional fraud may be too difficult to prove, con-
sumers may still plead the forms of fraud in addition to their con-
sumer law claims.63  To prove fraud in California, a claimant must
meet five elements: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of the
falsity of that misrepresentation, (3) intent to defraud or induce
reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage.64  Given
the knowledge requirements, claimants often use other types of
fraud, like negligent misrepresentation, as a safeguard.65
Proving negligent misrepresentation, also requires a showing
of five elements: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) with-
out reasonable grounds for believing that fact; (3) with intent to
induce another’s reliance; (4) inducing justifiable reliance thereon
by the person hearing the misrepresentation; and (5) damages.66
While negligent misrepresentation is a type of fraud, the primary
difference between the two claims is the scienter, or knowledge, re-
quirement.67  Negligent misrepresentation requires neither the in-
Proposition 64 amended UCL to limit claimants to those who actually suffered
injury to curb frivolous lawsuits).
61. See id. (explaining how ballot Proposition 64 amended UCL to limit claim-
ants to those who actually suffered injury to curb frivolous lawsuits).
62. See generally CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST, supra note 48 (explaining comparisons
and differences between statutes).
63. See e.g., Stutzman v. Armstrong, 2013 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 129204, *10 (E.D.
Cal., Aug. 2013) (No: 2:13-CV-0016-MCE-KJN) (plaintiffs pled fraud and negligent
misrepresentation in addition to consumer claims). See also 1-2 California White
Collar Crime and Business Litigation Sec. 3.2 (2013) (citing Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 17500) (explaining motivation for exacting FAL).
64. See Tom Trading, Inc. v. Better Blue, Inc., 26 F. App’x 733, 736 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 93 (2001)) (stating
elementary requirements of fraud).
65. See Susan L. Thomas, 34A Ca. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 43 (explaining ele-
ments of negligent misrepresentation and fraud). See, e.g., Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129205 at *61 (alleging fraud and negligent misrepresentation together).
66. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129205 at *61 (citing Petersen v. All-
state Indem. Co., 281 F.R.D. 413, 417 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (providing elements of
fraud).  That misrepresentation must be material. See id.
67. See Susan L. Thomas, 34A Ca. Jur. Fraud and Deceit § 43 (explaining ele-
ments of negligent misrepresentation and fraud).
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tent to defraud nor the intent to induce reliance, whereas fraud
requires such a showing.68
C. What it Means to Get “SLAPPed”
SLAPP suits are defined as suits that “ ‘masquerade as ordinary
lawsuits’. . . [and] they are generally meritless suits brought prima-
rily to chill the exercise of free speech.”69  In SLAPP suits, the pri-
mary goal of the plaintiffs is usually not to seek recovery from
defendants, but rather to silence a group or individual that has spo-
ken out against them by initiating costly and time-consuming litiga-
tion.70 SLAPP cases have been described as suits which:
(1) involve communications made to influence a govern-
ment action or outcome, (2) which result in civil law-
suits . . . (3) filed against non-governmental individuals or
groups (4) on a substantive issue of some public interest
or social significance’ to intimidate individuals and organi-
zations who speak out against corporate decisions . . . or
other activities that affect their financial interest.71
Originally, plaintiffs brought SLAPP suits against individuals
who were engaging in core First Amendment political speech such
as circulating petitions, reporting violations of the law, engaging in
peaceful protests, or lobbying for legislation.72  Further, the parties
to SLAPP suits involved a “plaintiff who could afford years of litiga-
tion . . . . whereas the defendant [was] often an ordinary ‘middle-
class[,] . . . middle-of-the-road American[ ].’”73  Due to the abuses
68. See id. (explaining elements of negligent misrepresentation and fraud).
See also Tom Trading, Inc. v. Better Blue, Inc., 26 F. App’x 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 93 (2001)) (stating elementary
requirements of fraud).
69. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl regard-
ing anti-SLAPP statute).SLAPP suits were first defined in a 1988 article by a Univer-
sity of Denver Law School Professor George Pring and a Sociology Professor
Penelope Canan.  See GEORGE PRING AND PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED
FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996) (identifying and explaining SLAPP suits).
70. See generally Carson Hilary Barylak, Note, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-
SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 846 (2010) (explaining original definition
of SLAPP statute).
71. See id. at 846 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (cit-
ing GEORGE PRING AND PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT (1996)) (noting what qualities make for SLAPP suits). But see PUBLIC PARTICI-
PATION PROJECT, supra note 18 (explaining that anybody can be subject to SLAPP).
72. See Braun, supra note 18, at 970 (citing George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 8 (1989) (explaining
typical SLAPP suit).
73. See Katelyn E. Saner, Note, Getting SLAPP-ed in Federal Court: Applying State
Anti-SLAPP Special Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court after Shady Grove, 63 DUKE L.J.
13
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inherent in SLAPP suits, courts and legislative bodies became frus-
trated that traditional defenses proved inadequate, as the truly abu-
sive natures of the suits often only became apparent after years of
pre-trial processes.74  As a result, at least twenty-nine states, includ-
ing California, have passed some form of anti-SLAPP statutes, which
give defendants a tool to combat such a suit.75
The California legislature shared this concern, noting in the
language of their Anti-SLAPP statute that there was a “disturbing
increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of
the constitutional right[ ] of freedom of speech . . . .”76  When Cali-
fornia enacted its Anti-SLAPP law in 1992, the legislature sought to
create a policy to encourage the public to participate in “matters of
public significance” without the potential threat of litigation, which
is also an abuse of the judicial process.77  The statute provides the
defendant a special motion to strike when the cause of action
against the defendant arises from “any act of that person in further-
ance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under” either
the United States or California Constitutions.78  To survive the mo-
781, 789-790 (2013) (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)
(citing George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Partici-
pation (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 937, 940 (1992) (describing why SLAPP suits are criticized). See also Braun,
supra note 18, at 1068 (discussing how “deep pocket” entities may use litigation to
exhaust adversaries). But see PARTICIPATION PROJECT, supra note 18 (explaining that
anybody can be subject to SLAPP).
74. See Saner, supra note 73, at 790 (explaining motivation for instituting anti-
SLAPP statutes).  The author notes that even before the enactment of anti-SLAPP
laws, some courts created their own common law remedy. See id. at 791 (describing
judicial solutions in response to lack of protection).  SLAPP suits are also problem-
atic because they further backlog the justice system with meritless and lengthy
claims procedures. See Braun, supra note 18 (explaining why SLAPPs are
problematic).
75. See PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, supra note 18 (listing states with anti-
SLAPP laws).
76. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(a) (Deering 2011), available at http://
codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/CCP/3/2/6/2/1/s425.16 (declaring reason for en-
acting motion).
77. See id. (presenting legislative findings leading to enactment of statute).
78. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1) (Deering 2011), available at http:/
/codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/CCP/3/2/6/2/1/s425.16  (providing right to use
special motion to strike).  The statute also clarifies what actions may be an “act in
furtherance of a person’s right . . . in connection with a public issue[,]” such as
statements before a legal or official proceeding or statements made in a place
open to the public. See id. § 425.16(e).  Defendants have a sixty-day window to file
the motion after service of the complaint, or at a later time at the court’s discre-
tion. See id. § 425.16(f).  Given this short window, some critics note that it can be
difficult for the plaintiff to prove the merits of the claim simply on the pleadings
without discovery. See Saner, supra note 73, at 793 (discussing difficulty of making
claims without discovery).
14
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tion, the plaintiffs must establish a probability that they will prevail
on their claim.79  Additionally, the statute can stay discovery pro-
ceedings until notice of an order has been given.80  If the special
motion is granted, defendants are entitled to recover attorney’s fees
and costs related to the claim.81
The California legislature’s word choice of “public interest” is
considered by California courts to be “inherently amorphous” and
following Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, these courts use two tests to de-
termine what qualifies for this undefined term.82  The first test, de-
veloped in Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO,83 considers three categories of public
issues, including: statements that concern a person in the public
79. See id. at § 425.16(b)(1)-(3) (Deering 2011), available at http://
codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/CCP/3/2/6/2/1/s425.16 (explaining burden of
proof).  In determining whether plaintiff will prevail, the court considers the
pleadings and affidavits from all parties which state the facts upon which the de-
fense or liability is based. See id. at § 425.16(b)(2).  If the court finds in favor of the
plaintiff, “neither that determination nor the fact of that determination shall be
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case . . . .” Id. at § 425.16(b)(3).
80. See id. § 425.16(g). See also Saner, supra note 73 (explaining purpose of
anti-SLAPP statutes).  Since it is hard to distinguish SLAPP suits from other legiti-
mate tort suits prior to completing discovery, this provision gives the defendants a
tool to avoid expensive and unnecessary discovery. See Saner, supra note 73, at 793.
In contrast, given that defendants have only sixty days to file the motion, some
critics note that it can be difficult for the plaintiff to prove the merits of the claim
simply on the pleadings without any discovery. See id.
81. See id. § 425.16(b)(3) (stating relief to those who prevail on motion to
strike).  Interestingly, in line with the spirit of the statute, if the special motion to
strike is found to be frivolous or is used only to cause delay, plaintiffs who prevail
on the motion may be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees. See id. (provid-
ing relief when anti-SLAPP motion to strike is abused).
82. See Vitus v. Steiner, No. 2:12-CV-01381-GEB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178962
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2012) (“Section 425.16 does not define ‘public interest’ or
‘public issue.’ Those terms are inherently amorphous and thus do not lend them-
selves to a precise, all-encompassing definition.” (quoting Cross v. Cooper, 197 Cal.
App. 4th 357, 371 (2011))). See also Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-
MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *16-17 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 9, 2013) (ex-
plaining source and application of multiple tests).  Rather than decide which state
test is appropriate, federal courts sitting in diversity apply both. See Stutzman, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *16-17. The Stutzman court noted the following:
California intermediate appellate courts have developed multiple tests to
determine whether a defendant’s activity is in connection with a public
issue.  In Hilton, the Ninth Circuit applied two tests: one from Rivero v.
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-
CIO . . . and one from Weinberg v. Feisel . . .
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 903 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing Rivero v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO, 105 Cal.App. 4th 913 (2003); Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal.
App. 4th 1122 (2003)).
83. 105 Cal. App. 4th 913 (Alameda Cnty. 2008) (providing test regarding
public issues).
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eye; conduct that directly affects many people beyond the direct
participants; or a topic of widespread, public interest.84
The second and more restrictive test requires that public inter-
est be something beyond “mere curiosity.”85  This test requires the
interest of a substantial number of people, “some degree of close-
ness” between the statements at issue and the public interest, the
focus of the conduct must be of public interest, and there must not
be a private matter that was merely communicated to many peo-
ple.86  Because the tests are so similar, courts have declined to de-
cide between the two tests and continue to apply both of them.87
Although the statute was designed to curb abuse of the system,
the meritless overuse of SLAPP motions has become equally prob-
lematic, as some defendants have used the motion as a “litigation
weapon.”88  In response, the California statute was amended in
2003 to exempt certain claims from SLAPP motions: when the
plaintiff does not seek relief greater than or different from the re-
lief sought for the general public, if the action as successful would
enforce a right affecting public interest or confer a significant bene-
fit on the general public or large class, or when private enforce-
ment is necessary and this places a disproportionate financial
burden as compared to the plaintiff’s stake in the claim.89  It also
exempts certain commercial speech and artistic and literary
works.90
84. See Doe v. Gangland Prods., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (citing Rivero, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 924) (explaining categories of public
issues).
85. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 906 (holding that Hallmark Cards could not use
Anti-SLAPP motion to strike in case where Paris Hilton filed suit over Hallmark’s
use of her likeness in greeting card) (citing Weinberg, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1132).
86. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 906-07 (quoting Weinberg, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1132-
33).
87. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 906-07 (declining to decide between tests because
both were met).  The Stutzman court followed this reasoning, and applied both
state court tests rather than deciding between the two. See Stutzman v. Armstrong,
No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, *18-20 (E.D. Cal. Sep.
9, 2013) (following Ninth Circuit precedent in applying both tests).
88. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl regard-
ing reforms for Anti-SLAPP statute since Anti-SLAPP motions have been used as a
“litigation weapon”). See also Barylak, supra note 70, at 848 (discussing overuse of
Anti-SLAPP motions).
89. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl regard-
ing reforms for Anti-SLAPP statute) (discussing proposed changes to law). See also
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b)(1)-(3) (Deering 2003) (listing exceptions to
statute).
90. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(c)(1)-(2) (Deering 2003) (describing
exemptions related to statements or conduct concerning businesses).
16
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Furthermore, although not a statutory exemption, defendants
cannot use the Anti-SLAPP motion to protect against speech made
in furtherance of illegal conduct because such speech is not enti-
tled to First Amendment protection.91  In California, speech that is
in furtherance of allegedly illegal conduct maintains protection,
and only loses protection if defendants concede to such illegality or
if the court conclusively determines through evidence that such ac-
tions are illegal.92  Accordingly, courts must determine whether the
actions in question are actually illegal as a matter of law before con-
tinuing the analysis.93
Importantly, these exemptions also have certain exemptions.94
The statute, as reformed in 2003, clarifies that the Anti-SLAPP mo-
tion may be used by “any person engaged in dissemination of ideas
or expression in any book . . . [and] any action against any person
or entity based upon the creation, dissemination, exhibition, adver-
tisement, or other similar promotion of any dramatic, literary . . . or
artistic work . . . .”95  These changes provided clarity to the question
of who may use the anti-SLAPP motion.96
Ultimately, once a defendant employs the Anti-SLAPP motion,
the court must engage in a two-tiered, burden shifting analysis.97
91. See Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding that “[t]he Anti-SLAPP statute cannot be invoked by a defendant whose
assertedly protected activity is illegal as a matter of law, and for that reason, not
protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and petition.” (citing Flatley
v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 13 (Cal. 2006))).
92. See id. (“[U]nder California state law, conduct that would otherwise come
within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute does not lose its coverage simply be-
cause it is alleged to have been unlawful or unethical.” (citing Birkner v. Lam, 156
Cal. App. 4th 275, 285 (2007))).
93. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129204, at *22 (E.D. Cal.  Sep. 9, 2013) (determining that issue of illegal
conduct is preliminary issue unrelated to plaintiff’s burden of proof and that
“[t]he asserted protected speech or petition activity loses protection only if it is
established through defendant’s concession or by uncontroverted and conclusive
evidence that the conduct is illegal as a matter of law.” (citing Lauter, 642 F. Supp.
2d at 1109)).
94. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b)(1)-(3) (Deering 2003), available at
http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/CCP/3/2/6/2/1/s425.17 (listing excep-
tions to statute). See also Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator
Kuehl regarding reforms for Anti-SLAPP statute).
95. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(d)(1)-(2) (Deering 2003), available at
http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/CCP/3/2/6/2/1/s425.17 (confirming per-
missible use of Anti-SLAPP statutes for literary works).
96. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl regard-
ing reforms for Anti-SLAPP statute). Contra Stutzman v. Armstrong, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 129204, 28-29 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (employing principles of statutory in-
terpretation to determine meaning and intention of statute reforms).
97. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *12-13 (“First, the defen-
dant moving to strike must make a threshold showing . . .[.]  Second, ‘[if] the
17
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The court must first determine whether the defendants have met
the threshold burden of proof that the challenged action was taken
“in furtherance of the exercise of free speech rights” in connection
with a public issue.98  If defendants meet their threshold burden,
the burden then shifts to the plaintiffs.99  In the second step, the
court must determine whether the plaintiffs, who have two opportu-
nities to survive the motion, have met their burden.100  Under the
statute, plaintiffs are required to show that their claim is legally suf-
ficient, such that there is a “reasonable probability” of prevailing in
their claims.101  Additionally, plaintiffs can also prove that their
claim is statutorily exempt from the defendant’s use of the Anti-
SLAPP motion.102  If the court finds that plaintiffs made either of
these showings, the Anti-SLAPP motion will be denied.103  If plain-
tiffs failed to meet their burden, the court must grant the Anti-
SLAPP motion to strike, but it must also provide plaintiffs an oppor-
tunity to amend their complaint.104  However, defendants are not
court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether
the plaintiff has demonstrated’” its burden (first and second alterations in origi-
nal) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Navellier v.
Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002))).
98. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4)) (explaining
system of analysis under Anti-SLAPP statute).
99. See id. (explaining burden shifting mechanism of statute). Critics note
that this burden shifting makes it unfairly difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on their
claims, especially without discovery proceedings. See generally Saner, supra note 73
(discussing inherent issues with Anti-SLAPP procedures).
100. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, *39-40 (“Accordingly,
‘[o]nce it is determined that an act in furtherance of protected expression is being
challenged, the plaintiff must show a reasonable probability of prevailing in its
claims for those claims to survive dismissal.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original) (quoting Metabolife Int’l. v. Susan Wornick, 264 F.3d 832
(9th Cir. 2001))).
101. See Metabolife Int’l. v. Susan Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 840 (citing Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 425.16(b)).
102. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.17-425.50 (Deering 2003) (listing statu-
tory exceptions).  For a discussion on the analysis and application of these exemp-
tions, see Stutzman v. Armstrong, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *28-29 (E.D.
Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (analyzing exemptions of Anti-SLAPP statute).
103. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl re-
garding reforms for Anti-SLAPP statute).
104. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §425.17 et seq. (Deering 2003) (providing proce-
dures for Anti-SLAPP motions). See also Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Co.,
377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “granting a defendant’s anti-
SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiff’s initial complaint without granting leave to
amend would directly collide with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)’s policy favoring liberal
amendment.”). But see Saner, supra note 73, at 808 (declaring that courts disagree
whether Anti-SLAPP procedures conflict with Federal Rules of Procedure).
18
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considered a prevailing party for the purposes of recovering attor-
neys’ fees until after proceedings have fully concluded.105
Finally, not all Federal Circuits agree that state SLAPP proce-
dures are available in federal court.106  Circuits are currently split
on this issue due to a disagreement about whether the special mo-
tion conflicts with the motion to dismiss available under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.107  However, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit
held that California’s Anti-SLAPP procedures are available to liti-
gants in federal court, as the laws do not conflict with Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.108  Thus, litigants are permitted to file for Cali-
fornia’s Anti-SLAPP special motion to strike in federal courts in the
Ninth Circuit.109
D. Where First Amendment Principles Collide: The Commercial
Speech Doctrine and the Protected Speech
of Literary Works
Since the First Amendment right to free speech provides the
foundation for Anti-SLAPP procedures, understanding Anti-SLAPP
motions requires insight into the First Amendment and Commer-
cial Speech Doctrine.110  While the First Amendment provides a
105. See, e.g., Thornbrough v. W. Placer Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-CV-02613-
GEV, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90173, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (noting that
defendant is not prevailing party under Anti-SLAPP statute when plaintiffs are
granted leave to amend).
106. See Saner, supra note 73, at 796-808 (explaining lack of clarity about
whether state SLAPP procedures apply in federal courts).
107. See id. (discussing split among circuits).  This is not an issue all circuits
have reached however, because not all states have Anti-SLAPP laws. See Public Par-
ticipation Project, supra note 18 (naming states that have Anti-SLAPP laws).
108. See Thomas v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1206, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2005)
(acknowledging precedent holding that California Anti-SLAPP motions are availa-
ble in federal court as anti-SLAPP procedures do not conflict with federal procedu-
ral rules) (citing United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th
Cir. 1999)). But see generally Saner, supra note 73 (explaining lack of clarity about
whether state SLAPP procedures apply in federal courts).  As of 2013, courts dis-
agreed about whether Anti-SLAPP motions should be available in federal courts.
See id. For example, while the First and Ninth Circuits have held that SLAPP mo-
tions do not conflict with federal procedural rules, the Federal District Court for
the District of Columbia has held that they do conflict with federal rules. See id. at
802-06 (citing Godin v. Schenks, 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010); 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842
F. Supp. 2d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2012)).
109. See Thomas, 400 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging precedent
holding that California Anti-SLAPP motions are available in federal court as anti-
SLAPP procedures do not conflict with federal procedural rules (citing United
States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999))).
110. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (noting that SLAPP suits are gener-
ally meritlessly intended to chill party’s first amendment right to free speech).  For
more information on cases where free speech that is commercial is at issue see
generally Samantha J. Katze, Note, A Million Little Maybes: The James Frey Scandal and
19
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general presumption in favor of free speech, commercial speech, or
speech that “does ‘no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion,’” is only entitled to limited protection.111  However, identify-
ing speech as commercial involves an analysis beyond whether
financial gain was involved.112
To determine whether speech is commercial, the Ninth Circuit
applies a three-pronged analysis based on the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Bolger v.  Youngs Drug Products Corporation.113  First, Ninth
Circuit courts must determine whether the speech “fall[s] within
the core notion of commercial speech,” meaning whether it does
no more than propose a commercial transaction.114  Second, if the
court finds that the speech is actually “mixed content”—such that it
is both commercial and noncommercial in nature—Ninth Circuit
courts then apply the test articulated in Bolger.115  Under Bolger,
speech is commercial if it is “admittedly advertising, [ ]the speech
references a specific product, and the speaker has an economic mo-
tive for engaging in such speech.”116
However, these characteristics are not dispositive and the anal-
ysis for protection of commercial speech does not end there.117  A
Statements on a Book Cover or Jacket as Commercial Speech, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 207, 221-25 (2006).
111. See Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relation Comm’n,
413 U.S. 377, 385 (1973)) (holding that because free flow of ideas is essential for
creating well-informed consumers, commercial speech is given limited protection
to also protect consumers). See generally Katze, supra note 110, at 221-24 (explain-
ing commercial speech doctrine with respect to scandal regarding sale of James
Frey’s book A Million Little Pieces as memoir when it was exposed as fabricated).
112. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (stating that “speech does
not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in
a paid advertisement of one form or another.” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
35-39 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 384; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964))).
113. See Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.
2012) (discussing commercial speech analysis and Supreme Court’s approach (cit-
ing Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)). See also Stutz-
man v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at
*43-44 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013)  (explaining source of analysis for commercial
speech in Ninth Circuit (citing Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 957)).
114. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66 (declaring qualification for commercial speech
(citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760-61)).
115. See Am. Acad. of Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.
2004) (explaining analysis of commercial speech (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67)).
116. See id. (stating factors).  The factor “admittedly advertising” requires that
defendants agree that the speech is a form of advertising. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *52 (noting that statements at issue were not admittedly
advertising because defendants denied they were advertising).
117. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *44 (“The Supreme Court
made clear that these three factors are not dispositive, but the ‘combination of all
20
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second test explained by the Ninth Circuit in Dex Media West, Inc. v.
City of Seattle creates a narrow exception even where the Bolger test
finds the speech commercial:
[E]ven if the publication meets this threshold commercial
speech classification, courts must determine whether the
speech still receives full First Amendment protection, be-
cause the commercial aspects of the speech are “inextrica-
bly intertwined” with otherwise fully protected speech,
such that the publication sheds its commercial character
and becomes fully protected speech.118
This exception reinstates full First Amendment protection
when protected and unprotected speech are “inextricably inter-
twined,” and is particularly applicable in the context of books,
which generally contain protected speech.119  As the California
Court of Appeals stated in Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., “no one
involved in modern jurisprudence can reasonably dispute [that]
the content of . . . books is entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment.”120
In spite of this, false commercial speech receives no protec-
tion.121  This lack of protection contrasts the general rule stated in
U.S. v. Alvarez, which holds that false speech made by private indi-
these characteristics . . . provides strong support for the . . . conclusion that the
[publication at issue is] properly characterized as commercial speech.’” (altera-
tions in original) (quoting Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 958))).
118. Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 958 (explaining how inextricable intertwinement
test clarifies status of commercial speech (citing Reiley v. Nat’l Federation of the
Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988))).
119. See Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 957-59 (explaining source of analysis for com-
mercial speech in Ninth Circuit).
120. Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 788-89 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that misleading statements in promotional materials on
jacket of book were unprotected commercial speech).
121. See generally Katze, supra note 110, at 222-24 (explaining protections and
limits on protections afforded commercial speech (citing Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp.  v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980))).  In Central
Hudson, the Supreme Court provided the following four-part test for commercial
speech cases:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within the provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both
inquires yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it
is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (discussing four-part analysis).
21
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viduals is entitled to protection.122  This doctrine that exempts false
commercial speech from the general rule is recognized by the Su-
preme Court and sets the foundation for consumer protection stat-
utes, both at the state and federal level.123  However, protecting
consumers and protecting free speech rights requires some balanc-
ing.  Even though false statements may not appear worthy of First
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has concluded that
such speech is essential to ensure the free flow of ideas, and thus
deserve First Amendment protection.124  Although the states may
regulate the publication of false statements of facts, “a rule of strict
liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the
accuracy of his factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censor-
ship.”125  This balancing recognizes a strong policy in favor of pro-
tecting book publishers by neither imposing a requirement to fact
check nor requiring they guarantee the truthfulness of book
contents.126
Even so, readers continue to challenge authors and publishers
in court when it is revealed that stories, advertised as truthful
122. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking down Stolen
Valor Act because lies are protected form of free speech).  As the Alvarez court
noted, there is value in protecting falsehoods in order to prevent the chill of other
speech. See id. at 2548. Likewise, when a private person is speaking, they are enti-
tled to protection because “[s]peaking about oneself is precisely when people are
most likely to exaggerate, obfuscate, embellish, omit key facts, or tell tall tales.” See
U.S. v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 2011) (Koziniski, C.J., concurring in
denial of rehearing petition), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
123. See 1-2 California White Collar Crime and Business Litigation Sec. 3.2 (2013)
(“Section 17500 [California’s Unfair Competition Law] has been consistently up-
held as a valid constitutional exercise of the state’s police power regulatory author-
ity.  It has survived constitutional challenges involving: The commerce clause of
the U.S. Constitution . . . Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process .  . . [and
the] First Amendment freedom of speech.”). See also Kantze, supra note 110, at 223
(“Unlike truthful commercial speech, which receives some First Amendment Pro-
tection, albeit less than other forms of speech, false commercial speech falls
outside the purview of the First Amendment.  Consequently, the state and federal
government may freely regulate such statements through the enactment of con-
sumer protection statutes.”).
124. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (holding that
First Amendment is defense to defamation claims brought by private persons).
125. See id. at 340 (placing limits on state control of First Amendment issues).
126. Compare Barden v. Harpercollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F.Supp. 41, 45 (D.
Mass. 1994) (holding that misrepresentations relating to attorney qualifications on
book covers were not unfair or deceptive practices nor actionable under negligent
misrepresentation) and Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that people who became ill after picking mushrooms advo-
cated by advice in book could not recover for products liability and publishers had
no duty to investigate contents of books) with Lacoff v. Buena Vista Publishing,
Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d 183, 191 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that statements advertis-
ing book as how-to investment guide were protected noncommercial speech).
22
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memoirs, turn out to be falsified.127  In 2006, readers sued author
James Frey and his publishers over the book A Million Little Pieces
after it was exposed that his so-called inspiring “memoir” was largely
fabricated.128  The suit, which alleged consumer fraud, false adver-
tising, unfair competition, and misrepresentation among other
claims, reportedly settled.129  A similar suit brought in 2012 against
author Greg Mortensen and his publishers of the book Three Cups of
Tea was dismissed for failure to state a claim by the Federal District
Court in Montana.130
Previously, in 1999 and 2000, readers filed class action suits in
New York and California over books that suggested that following
the provided investment model in the book would yield similar re-
turns.131  Although the New York Supreme Court found that the
advertisements on the cover of the book were protected speech, the
California Court of Appeals disagreed.132  That court found that
California has a “legitimate right to protect the public” from false
advertising, and thus concluded that the advertising statements
were commercial speech and therefore, unprotected.133
127. See generally Katze, supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing
outcome of claims against James Frey and similar suits in response to false books
advertised as memoirs).
128. See generally Katze, supra note 110, at 207 n.2 (describing settlement).
According to the New York Times, both the author and publishers proposed a
settlement involving refunds for customer purchase fees and lawyers’ fees and a
donation to charity not to exceed $2.35 million. See also Daniel Fisher, A Million
Little Lawsuits over Frey Book?, FORBES MAGAZINE (Jan. 30, 2006, 7:28 pm), http://
www.forbes.com/2006/01/30/frey-book-lawsuit-cz_df_0130autofacescan13.html
(explaining lawsuit against Frey over book).
129. See Lance Armstrong Sued for Fraud over Memoirs, CBS NEWS (Jan. 24, 2013,
12:22 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lance-armstrong-sued-for-fraud-over-
memoirs/ (describing similar suits).  Random House publishers reportedly paid
$27,348 in refunds, $180,000 to charity, and $1,000,000 in legal fees in a settle-
ment. See id.
130. See Pfau v. Mortenson, 858 F.Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Mont. 2012), aff’d, 2013
U.S.  App. LEXIS 20567 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing case for failure to state claim
on fraud, deceit, contract claims, and claims under the Racketeer Influence and
Corrupt Organizations Act at Title 18 U.S.C § 1961 et. seq.)).
131. See generally Katze, supra note 110, at 224-30 (discussing “Beardstown La-
dies” cases).
132. See generally Katze, supra note 110, at 224-30 (explaining conflicting out-
comes regarding same factual circumstances). Compare Lacoff v. Buena Vista
Publ’g Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding advertisements on
jacket cover were protected noncommercial speech) with Keimer v. Buena Vista
Books, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding advertisements on jacket
cover were not protected noncommercial speech).
133. See Keimer, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783 (holding advertisements on jacket
cover were not protected noncommercial speech).
23
Haslinsky: Lance Armstrong Wins Again by Surviving a Lawsuit for Misrepresen
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 74 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 74 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS103.txt unknown Seq: 24  6-APR-15 15:59
132 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 109
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In determining whether the defendants in Stutzman were enti-
tled to their Anti-SLAPP motion to strike, the District Court for the
Eastern District of California engaged in a three-step analysis of the
issues within the scheme of the Anti-SLAPP procedures.134  The
three steps included determining: first, whether defendants met
their burden by showing that their acts at issue were in furtherance
of defendant’s right of free speech in connection with a public is-
sue; second, whether the actions are exempt from Anti-SLAPP mo-
tions; and third, whether plaintiffs met their burden as required by
the SLAPP statutes.135  These burden-shifting elements of the Anti-
SLAPP statute provided the structure for the court’s analysis.136
A. Defendant’s Burden
The court had to first decide whether Lance Armstrong quali-
fied as a topic of “public interest” as required by the two applicable
tests.137  This order of analysis was dictated by the defendants’ claim
that their statements in the books and about the books were actions
in furtherance of free speech as related to public issues.138  The
court quickly decided the first test was met because both statements
regarding Lance Armstrong and his bestselling books were “without
question” of public interest.139  Likewise, because Armstrong’s
books concerned his public cycling career, not just his personal life,
the books were in furtherance of free speech.140  Thus, the speech
134. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129204, at *14 (E. D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013) (explaining organization and
threshold questions).
135. See id. (listing major issues in case).
136. For a more detailed discussion of the process for analyzing Anti-SLAPP
motions, see supra notes 69-109 and accompanying text (discussing statutory pro-
cess of California’s Anti-SLAPP law).
137. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *16-17 (determining
whether defendants’ burden was met by deciding whether speech at issue con-
cerned issue of public interest).  For a discussion of the two California state court
tests applied here, see supra notes 82 -86 and accompanying text.
138. See id. at *16-17 (analyzing within framework of SLAPP statute).
139. See id. at *17. Because Lance Armstrong is a famous figure, the court
likened this scenario to Paris Hilton, another figure that was found to be of public
interest in a similar suit. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 907 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that Paris Hilton was a topic of widespread public interest).  New
York Times Bestsellers are also, by their very nature, topics of public interest. See
Wallace v. Henderson, No. CIV 09CV1603-L(WMC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30519,
at *7 (S.D. Ca. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding book on New York Times Bestseller list
topic of widespread public interest).
140. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *21-22 (explaining how
this case surpasses limitation expressed in Weinberg).
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about the books, speech in the books, and conduct in furtherance
of those statements by the other defendants met the threshold bur-
den required by the Anti-SLAPP statute.141
B. Anti-SLAPP Motion Exemptions
Having found the defendants easily satisfied their burden, the
court next turned to whether the actions where otherwise exempt
from SLAPP motions.142  In doing so, the court first responded to
plaintiffs’ assertion that the defendants could not use the Anti-
SLAPP motion to protect themselves from illegal activity.143  Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs argued Armstrong’s admittance to drug traffick-
ing precluded him from evoking the Anti-SLAPP motion, because
that conduct is illegal.144  While the court did agree with the plain-
tiffs that speech related to illegal activity is not protected speech
under the First Amendment, the court did not ultimately adopt the
plaintiffs’ position.145  Instead, the court recognized that “conduct
that would otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP stat-
ute does not lose its coverage simply because it is alleged to have
been unlawful or unethical.”146  The court further explained its po-
sition by stating that the illegal action of drug trafficking was not
the underlying conduct at issue.147  Rather, the activity at issue was
Armstrong’s statements that he did not use drugs, the content of
the books, and the promotional materials, none of which are crimi-
nal in themselves.148
141. See id. at *17-18 (“Here, it is without question that statements concerning
Lance Armstrong ‘concern a person or entity in the public eye’ and/or are ‘a topic
of widespread, public interest.’”).
142. See id. at *22-25 (explaining exemptions plaintiffs claimed).  The Califor-
nia Legislature enacted such exemptions under Section 425.17 of the California
Civil Code to curb overuse of the motions. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15.
143. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *22-25 (describing claims
that defendants’ conduct was in furtherance of illegal actions).  For a further dis-
cussion of why illegal activity serves as an exception, see supra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text.
144. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *22-25 (explaining plain-
tiffs contention that Armstrong’s actions of drug trafficking were not entitled to
protection by the Anti-SLAPP motion).
145. See id. (citing Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1108, 1109
(C.D. Cal. 2009)) (discussing California law requiring analysis whether conduct at
issue is actually illegal).
146. See id. at *23 (citing Lauter, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 1108) (explaining nuances
of application).
147. See id. (explaining reasoning behind analysis).
148. See id. at *24 (explaining exemption is inapplicable because plaintiff re-
lied on illegal conduct that was not basis of actions in case). Accord United States v.
Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2011) (declaring that false statements made by
private person are entitled to First Amendment protection).
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The court next addressed the plaintiffs’ contentions that their
claims were exempt from the Anti-SLAPP motion.149  In opposition
the defendants claimed that, even if the statutory exemptions did
apply, defendants met the exemptions to the exemptions that pro-
tect any dramatic or literary work; this led the court to pass over the
analysis of the exemptions claimed by the plaintiffs.150
As there are only a few cases addressing the recently added
exemptions, this court relied on California’s principals of statutory
construction and interpretation to determine whether the statutory
exemptions applied.151  After considering legislative intent and the
text’s plain meaning, the court determined that the word “work”
encompasses books such as Armstrong’s.152  Likewise, after consid-
ering legislative history and public policy, the court concluded the
legislative history and public policy considerations of the statute
provided that Anti-SLAPP motions were intended to apply to au-
thors and publishers of books.153  As such, the court found that
none of the exemptions limited the defendants’ use of the
motion.154
C. Plaintiff’s Burden
Finally, the court determined whether the plaintiffs met their
burden to survive the motion.155  The court noted that the
probability presented need not be high, but rather, when claims
cannot meet the requisite burden, those cases tend to “lack even
149. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *25-29 (explaining plain-
tiffs contention that commercial speech is not protected under exemptions).  For
a discussion on these statutory exemptions, see supra notes 89-95 and accompany-
ing text.
150. See id. at *25 (“Plaintiffs contend that both sections 425.17(b) and (c)
exempt Plaintiff’s first Amended Complaint from an anti-SLAPP motion.  How-
ever, Defendants respond that even if these statutory exemptions apply, Defend-
ants meet the statutory exception to the exemptions, set out in section
425.17(d).”).
151. See id. at *28-29 (“Few cases have dealt with the application of subsection
(d) . . . .  [w]here there is no binding authority, a court must undertake to ascer-
tain the meaning of the statute by use of statutory interpretation.” (citations
omitted)).
152. See id. at *31-32 (noting that California Appellate courts consider work as
something to involve creative effort).
153. See id. at *37-39 (explaining how meaning of statute protects use of Anti-
SLAPP motion in case).
154. See id. at *39 (describing decision regarding validation of motion).
155. See id. at *40 (analyzing plaintiffs’ burden as second step under Anti-
SLAPP statutory scheme).  For a discussion of the burden-shifting elements of this
statute, see supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
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minimal merit.”156  In response to plaintiffs’ Unfair Competition,
Consumer Legal Remedies, and False Advertising claims, defend-
ants raised the First Amendment as a defense.157  This required the
court to apply the Commercial Speech Doctrine, and the related
tests to determine whether the speech is commercial or mixed con-
tent.158  This inquiry was necessary because, as the court noted, “the
strength of First Amendment protection afforded ‘depends on
whether the activity sought to be regulated constitutes commercial
or noncommercial speech.’”159  Thus, the court subjected the com-
mercial speech at issue to the Ninth Circuit’s version of the Bolger
test, and any mixed speech to the Dex Media test for inextricable
intertwinement.160
The nature of the speech required that the court separate the
speech at issue into three categories in order to analyze the speech
to ensure each speech received the appropriate level of protec-
tion.161  The court organized its analysis by the three types of state-
ments at issue:
[1] statements contained within the [b]ooks them-
selves[;] . . . . [2] statements relating to the [b]ooks, in-
156. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *25-29 (quoting Hilton v.
Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2010)).  Because the first step is prov-
ing that the challenged act is in furtherance of protected expression, this “second
step” the court refers to is the burden that is shifted to the plaintiff. See id. This
statement made by the California Supreme Court highlights the problem with
these types of suits—the meritless nature of the suits is generally not discovered
until trial. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl re-
garding need to reform anti-SLAPP statute).
157. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *42 (“California’s con-
sumer protection laws, like the unfair competition law, govern only commercial
speech.” (quoting Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th 135
(2004))).
158. See id. at *43 (explaining three-prong test applied in Ninth Circuit).  For
a discussion on the Supreme Court cases that instruct the commercial speech doc-
trine analysis, see supra notes 47-133 of this Casenote.
159. See id. at *43 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65
(1983) (describing First Amendment implications related to free speech).  While
the First Amendment does not authorize the government to restrict speech based
on content or subject matter, commercial speech operates in a slightly different
realm. See id. at *42 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65).  Likewise, civil litigation is fre-
quently treated as an interference with speech, but where consumer speech is false
or misleading, that speech will be granted no protection under first amendment
grounds. See id. at *42-43 (citations omitted) (citing New York Times v.  Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184
(9th Cir. 2011)).
160. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *42 (explaining source of
Ninth Circuit analysis).  For a discussion of the Bolger test and the Ninth Circuit’s
application, see supra notes 113-133 and accompanying text.
161. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *45 (“In this case, the
speech at issue can be divided into three types or categories.”).
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cluding promotion statements . . . and statements
contained on the flyleaves and covers of the
[b]ooks[;] . . . .  [3]statements made by Armstrong and
Stapleton relating to Armstrong’s use of performance en-
hancing drugs, but which do not specifically reference the
[b]ooks or promote the [b]ooks.162
As for the statements in the books, the court quickly declared
these statements as fully protected speech because the statements
were neither commercial nor mixed content.163  Rather, the books
contained statements about Armstrong’s childhood, personal rela-
tionships, cancer, and cycling career.164  The court even repri-
manded the plaintiffs for suggesting the speech was commercial,
and warned they came close to “ignor[ing] ‘modern jurispru-
dence[.]’”165  Ultimately, despite the fact that the books contained
obviously false and misleading claims, the strong presumption in
favor of free speech protected the content of the books.166
The second type of speech at issue—statements related to Arm-
strong’s use of performance enhancing drugs—was also easily
found not to be commercial speech.167  The court noted that, be-
cause there was no commercial transaction proposed, further in-
quiry was unnecessary.168  Nonetheless, the court subjected the
162. See id. at *45. (outlining categories of statements for further analysis).
163. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *46 (“The content of the
Armstrong Books is not an advertisement for a product; rather, the statements are
Armstrong’s account, albeit partially untruthful, of his life and cycling career.”).
164. See id. (describing contents of books).
165. See id. at *46-47 (“While Plaintiffs in this case do not go so far as to ig-
nore ‘modern jurisprudence’ and dispute that the content of the Books is entitled
to full First Amendment protection, they come quite close.”).
166. See id. at *47-48 (explaining why books were not commercial speech).  In
precedent, California courts have noted that “no one involved in modern jurispru-
dence can reasonably dispute [that] the content of [the] books entitled the the full
protection of the First Amendment.” See id. (alterations in original) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Keimer v. Buena Vista Books,
Inc., 75 Ca. App. 4th 1220, 1231 (1999)).  The court nearly admonished plaintiff’s
counsel for “ignor[ing] ‘modern jurisprudence” by claiming that, “that’s not how
books are sold nowadays.” See id. at *47.  This was an interesting attempt that, given
Armstrong’s fame, the content of the books is allegedly what drove some of the
plaintiffs to purchase the books. See infra note 196. Nonetheless, as the Court
noted, the First Amendment is so strongly in favor of free speech, courts give “near
absolute protection . . . to false but nondefamatory statements of facts outside the
commercial realm.” Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *48 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alvarez,
638 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
opinion)).
167. Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *49-50 (discussing statements
about defendant Armstrong’s use of performance enhancement drugs).
168. See id. at *49 (describing why statements failed test).
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statements to the Bolger test for mixed-content “for the sake of thor-
ough analysis.”169  While the plaintiffs urged the court to treat Arm-
strong as a “brand” and asserted that Armstrong and the other
defendants “financially benefited from convincing the public that
Armstrong did not use performance enhancing drugs[,]” the court
declined to do so, because economic motivations alone are insuffi-
cient to establish commercial speech.170
Next, the court addressed at greater length whether the pro-
motional statements relating to the books were commercial speech,
but found they were protected in their own right.171  The court
found that the speech at issue did more than propose financial
transaction because it described the content of the books as bio-
graphical, as well as Lance Armstrong himself, and this “informa-
tional” and promotional nature of the speech qualified as mixed
content, which required analysis under Bolger.172  First, the Court
found that, because the defendants adamantly denied this was com-
mercial speech, this was “by no means admittedly an advertise-
ment[,]” which failed the first prong.173  However, defendants did
meet the second and third prongs as the statements clearly referred
to a specific product—the books—and, because the statements
were clearly made to sell the books, an economic motivation
existed.174
169. See id. (discussing application of Bolger test).
170. See id. at *49-50 (explaining why UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims failed).
The Court did not want to extend the meaning of the “product” or “brand”, as in
Bolger and other courts, the products were more tangible items such as contracep-
tives or shea butter. See id. at *49 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 66 (1983); Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Likewise, the assertion that the defendants financially benefited from Armstrong’s
statements only satisfied one of the three Bolger factors. See id. at *50 (explaining
why statements failed Bolger test).
171. See id. at *55 (“[T]he promotional materials relating to the Books are
inextricably intertwined with the Books’ contents, which is non-commercial
speech.  Thus, these promotional materials are also entitled to full First Amend-
ment protection as noncommercial speech.”).  The promotional statements in-
cluded representations that the books were “nonfiction biography” and that “false
and misleading statements” were made through the media and in interviews,” and
statements on the flyleaves and book jackets. Id. at *51.
172. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *52 (explaining why
speech was did more than propose a commercial transaction).
173. See id. at *52 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Am. Acad. of
Pain Mgmt. v. Joseph, 353 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004)).  In Bolger, the defend-
ants “conceded” that the pamphlets at issue were advertising, but that this “clearly
does not compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech.” See Bolger, 463
U.S. at 66 (citing New York Times v.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1964)).
174. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *52 (describing applica-
tion of factors of Bolger test).
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Due to the nature of the product, the third factor was not af-
forded much weight due to the concern of chilling free speech.175
As the Supreme Court has instructed, merely because “books, news-
papers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not
prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safe-
guarded by the First Amendment.”176  The court did not give this
factor much weight because an economic motivation is not enough
to characterize such publications as commercial.177
Even so, the court still had to determine under the third prong
whether the speech was protected to the fullest extent under the
First Amendment.178  Under the Ninth Circuit “inextricable inter-
twinement” test developed in Dex Media, speech may be eligible for
“full First Amendment protection because the commercial aspects
of the speech are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with otherwise fully pro-
tected speech, such that [it] sheds its commercial character[.]”179
Here, policy concerns led the court to the conclusion that the
promotional statements and protected content were inextricably in-
tertwined with each other.180  In other words, given that the con-
tent of the books are afforded full protection, commercial material
promoting that fully protected speech receives the same full protec-
tion by association.181  As the court reasoned, the “economic real-
175. See id. at *53 (“[W]hile the third Bolger factor is satisfied, the Court, in
order to balance the concerns of the First Amendment, does not afford this factor
much weight.”).
176. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).  The district
court in Stutzman also relied on the Court’s proposition in Joseph Burstyn. See Stutz-
man, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *52 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501).
177. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *53 (quoting Dex Media
W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2012)).  This minimal weight
afforded means that, although the factors are technically met and the speech is
considered commercial, defining it as “definitely commercial” is unnecessary as
they are afforded full First Amendment protection. See id. at *52 (explaining mini-
mal weight afforded third Bolger prong given nature of products at issue).
178. See id. at *53 (“The third prong of the Bolger Framework requires the
Court to examine whether this speech may ‘still receive[ ] full First Amendment
protection’” because of inextricable intertwinement. (alteration in original) (cit-
ing Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 958)). See also Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 958 (explaining
inextricable intertwinement test).
179. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *53 (first alteration ad-
ded) (citing Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 958) (discussing inextricable intertwinement).
180. See id. at *54.  The court referenced Dex Media, where commercial com-
ponents of charitable speech and commercial speech in yellow pages respectively
were intertwined with the noncommercial content. See Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 963
(discussing intertwinement of commercial and noncommercial speech).
181. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *54  (“In Dex Media, the
Ninth Circuit stated that ‘[t]he full First Amendment protection of newspapers,
magazines, television shows, radio programs, and the like demonstrates that the
inclusion of commercial material does not support treating those publications and
30
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ity” is that publishers must be able to promote the books they
publish in order to sell them, making it impossible to separate pro-
motional materials from the books themselves.182  As a result, de-
fendants prevailed on their anti-motion claims for the UCL, FAL,
and CLRA claims for these three types of speech.183
Next, the court analyzed the fraud claims filed against defen-
dant-publishers and defendants Stapleton and Weisel and, in the
process, determined that both fraud claims should also be
stricken.184  The publishers claimed they made no misrepresenta-
tions, as the book is technically nonfiction.185  Under their reason-
ing, labeling a book as nonfiction is not a guarantee that “every
statement is in fact demonstrably true[,]” but rather that the story is
based on true events.186  This argument made sense to the court;
Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France, but no longer had the
titles.187  Since the plaintiffs could not even show that a misrepre-
sentation was made, the court also struck this fraud claim.188
broadcasts as commercial speech entitled to less First Amendment protection.’”
(first alteration in original) (quoting Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 963)).
182. See id. at *54-55 (explaining why statements about books and statements
in books are equally protected).  The court relied on Dex Media, where the Ninth
Circuit was concerned with “the economic reality that advertising is required to
keep newspapers, magazines, and telephone directories afloat, [and] the same is
true of books and publishers.” See id. at *55 (citing Dex Media, 696 F.3d at 963).
The court also noted that plaintiffs conceded this proposition at oral argument.
See id. at *55.
183. See id. at *55 (“Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motions to strike Plaintiff’s UCL,
FAL, and CLRA claims are therefore granted.”).
184. See id. at *56-60 (citing Tom Trading, Inc. v. Better Blue, Inc., 26 F.
Appx. 733, 736 (9th Cir. 2002)) (finding fraud motions both stricken).  In Califor-
nia, to prove fraud, a plaintiff must plead with particularity misrepresentation,
knowledge of falsity, intent to defraud or induce reliance, justifiable reliance, and
the resulting damage. See Tom Trading, Inc., 26 F. App’x at 736 (citing Lovejoy v.
AT&T Corp., 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 93 (2001)) (stating elementary requirements of
fraud).
185. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *56 (“Defendants contend
that these statements are in fact true—Defendant Armstrong did win the Tour de
France, even though these victories were later taken away from him, and the book
is a biography and nonfiction, even though it is apparent that the book contains
false statements.”).
186. See id. at *57 (“Other courts have held that ‘the term nonfiction only
means that the literature is based on true stories or events, not that every statement
is in fact demonstrably true.”). See also Greenspan v. Random House, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 220 (D. Mass. 2012) aff’d, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22285 (1st Cir.
2012) (declining to hold requirement for publishers to fact check).
187. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *57 (reasoning that state-
ments were not false, as Armstrong was Tour de France winner at one time).
188. See id. at *56-57 (quoting Greenspan v. Random House, Inc., 859 F.
Supp. 2d 206, 220 (D. Mass. 2012) aff’d, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22285 (1st Cir.
2012)).  Recall that the Stutzman court noted the following from the concurring
opinion in Alvarez: “[s]peaking about oneself is precisely when people are most
31
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Turning to defendants Stapleton and Weisel, the court found
that the plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity how either de-
fendant engaged in fraudulent conduct and failed to present proof
that plaintiffs actually relied on statements made by Stapleton and
Weisel.189  Plaintiffs attempted to claim that defendants Stapleton
and Weisel “built the brand” of Lance Armstrong through inter-
views, and as such aided and abetted in publishing the books all
while aware of the truth that Armstrong systematically doped.190
However, the requisite reliance was lacking, since plaintiffs never
stated they relied on statements made specifically by these defend-
ants.191  Without the requisite particularity or proof of actual reli-
ance, the court struck these claims as well.192
Finally, the court struck the claims for negligent misrepresenta-
tion, because the policy behind encouraging free speech out-
weighed plaintiffs’ policy claims that public interest suggests
protecting consumers from false statements.193  The court relied on
precedent from various jurisdictions stating that a publisher has no
duty to “investigate the accuracy of the contents of the books it pub-
lishes[,]” because such a requirement would unreasonably raise the
costs of publishing and produce a “chilling effect on the free flow
of ideas [that the] First Amendment seeks to avoid.”194  Although
likely to exaggerate, obfuscate, embellish, omit key facts, or tell tall tales.” See id. at
*57 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674
(9th Cir. 2011) (Koziniski, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing petition), aff’d,
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)).
189. See id. at *59-60. (explaining why fraud claims failed against Stapleton
and Weisel).
190. See id. (explaining aforementioned allegations).
191. See id. at *58 (describing what statements plaintiffs did rely on).
192. See id. at *57-60 (“Because Plaintiffs fail to state a legally cognizable claim
against Defendants Stapleton and Weisel, their motions to strike Plaintiffs’ fraud
claims are granted.”).
193. See id. at *63 (explaining finding for defendants publishers for misrepre-
sentation).  To prove negligent misrepresentation in California, a claimant must
show the following: “(1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact; (2)
without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true; (3) with intent to induce
another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented; (4) justifiable reliance thereon by
the party to whom the misrepresentation was directed; and (5) damages.” See id. at
*61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Peterson v. Allstate Indem. Co.,
281 F.R.D. 413, 417 (C.D. Cal. 2012)) (describing elements of negligent misrepre-
sentation under California law).
194. See id. at *61-63 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Barden v.
Harpercollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D. Mass. 1994); Winter v. G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 983 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991))  Further, the court illumi-
nated its point with the following quote: “ ‘[T]he gentle tug of the First Amend-
ment and the values embodied therein . . . remind us of the social cost’ were the
Court to create such a [fact-checking] duty for publishers, and to allow publishers
to be held liable for allegedly fast statements contained within a book.” See id. at
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the court briefly noted the plaintiffs’ policy concerns for protecting
unwitting consumers, it was instead persuaded that First Amend-
ment jurisprudence instructs that the public interest pendulum
swing the other way—in favor of protecting free speech.195  Again,
because the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden and failed to
make conclusive statements attributed to defendants Weisel and
Stapleton, the court also granted the defendants’ motion on these
claims.196
Although the court agreed the plaintiffs were unable to show a
probability of success on any of their claims, it did grant plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint.197  The plaintiffs, however, chose
not to amend.198  By granting leave, the court also left open the
opportunity for defendants to collect attorney fees.199
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Eastern District of California’s decision in Stutzman v.
Armstrong, which granted Lance Armstrong, his publishers, man-
ager, and financier their Anti-SLAPP motion to strike in response
to the claims brought by consumers who purchased his books with
the belief they were biographical, highlights important policy argu-
ments.200  To the court’s credit, the opinion follows a consistent
line of reasoning while sifting through the complicated interplay of
*63 (second alteration in original) (citing Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 983 F.2d
1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991))).
195. See id. at *63 (noting that, “although Plaintiffs assert that the public inter-
est . . . weighs in favor of protecting consumers from books that contain false state-
ments, the case law makes clear that the public interest swings in the opposite
direction, towards closely guarding the right . . . the First Amendment seeks to
protect.”)
196. See id. at *63-64 (granting motion with respect to misrepresentation
claims).
197. See id. at *64-66 (granting leave to amend complaint).  There is an ex-
isting principle in the Ninth Circuit that “granting a defendant’s anti-SLAPP mo-
tion to strike a plaintiff’s initial complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to
amend would directly collide with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)’s policy
favoring liberal amendment.” See id. at *64-65 (citing Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad
Commc’ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004)).
198. Plaintiffs were granted twenty-one days to file the complaint. See id. at
*67 (listing orders). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) (providing defendants with
plaintiffs’ notice of dismissal with prejudice).  For a discussion of the varying court
opinions on this issue, see supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
199. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *67. See also Thornbrough
v.  W. Placer Unified Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-CV-02613-GEB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90173 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“However, where a plaintiff is granted leave to amend the
complaint, a defendant whose anti-SLAPP motion is granted is not a “prevailing
party” for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statutory framework.”).
200. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *66-67 (stating holding).
The competing interests here, free speech and consumer protection are both
33
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laws, exemptions, and strong policy arguments favoring both
sides.201  Likewise, the analysis fulfilled one of strong purposes of
the SLAPP statute—it properly disposed of a largely meritless
suit.202  The opinion, however, may not have adequately recognized
the countervailing policy arguments favoring consumers.203
First, with respect to the interplay of free speech, Judge En-
gland consistently considered the great weight of the danger of
chilling free speech.204  Throughout the opinion, the free speech
issues were recognized and addressed, which created a consistent
pattern for prevailing issues.205  At all points of analysis, the court
highlighted the chilling effect on free speech to show the impor-
tance of this policy.206
However, despite that internal consistency and faithful respect
of free speech concerns, the court did sidestep the strong policy
arguments working in favor of the plaintiffs.207  Rather than recog-
founded in strong policy arguments, and for a discussion of these policies, see
supra notes 47-133 and accompanying text.
201. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *48-57 (providing exam-
ples of free speech concerns).  The court consistently noted back to the threat of
chilling free speech by requiring publishers to fact check or verify the truthfulness
of memoirs, the protection of false speech by private persons, and the protected
statements made in books. See id. The court maintained this consistency all while
applying the Anti-SLAPP statutory framework. See, e.g., id. at *40-45 (discussing
commercial speech doctrines as element of plaintiff’s burden under anti-SLAPP
law).
202. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §425.16(a) (Deering 2011) (presenting legisla-
tive findings leading to enactment of statute). See also Bill Analysis Hearing, supra
note 15  (statement of Senator Kuehl regarding anti-SLAPP statute that statute is
designed to protect those dragged into meritless litigation). See generally, Braun,
supra note 18, at 970 (describing purpose of SLAPP laws).
203. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129204, *63 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 2013) (“[A]lthough plaintiffs assert the pub-
lic interest in this case weighs in favor of protecting consumers from books that
contain false statements, the case law makes clear that the public interest . . . favors
free speech”). But see Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1220
(1999) (holding that advertisements on book jackets were commercial speech and
less protected); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that misleading commercial speech acquires less protection than
truthful commercial speech).
204. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *42-44 (describing basic
guiding principles regarding First Amendment jurisprudence).
205. See id. at *14 (“First, the Court must determine whether Defendants have
met their burden by making a threshold showing that the acts of which Plaintiffs
complain were taken in furtherance of Defendants’ right of free speech in connec-
tion with a public issue.”).
206. See id. at *42-43 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
65-67 (1983)) (noting that generally First Amendment provides a presumption in
favor of free speech and that civil liability exists for free speech issues).
207. See id. at *63 (finding that protection of First Amendment rights out-
weighs policy arguments raised by Plaintiffs).  The court merely recognized the
policy concerns asserted by the Plaintiffs, but quickly dismissed in favor of First
34
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nizing the serious consumer protection policy concerns at play, the
court dismissed these concerns relatively quickly in favor of policy
protecting the First Amendment.208  In doing so, the court ignored
California precedent, Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, which held that
advertising statements on the cover of the books are unprotected
commercial speech.209  The court acknowledged that opinion only
when discussing the protected content in the books.210  In contrast,
when discussing the promotional statements about the books,
where that opinion is most relevant, the court only applied the
more recent Ninth Circuit opinion in Dex Media and the test for
inextricable intertwinement.211  Although it properly recognized
more recent precedent, it is curious that the court failed to men-
tion that precedent where it applied most directly.212  This strong
interest in protecting consumers in spite of First Amendment policy
must not be completely irrelevant, if in 2006 publishers and author
James Frey settled a very similar case for an amount upwards of two
million dollars.213
Amendment policy. See id. But see Lacoff v. Buena Vista Publ’g, Inc., 705 N.Y.S.2d
183, 190 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that statements advertising a book as how-to
investment guide were protected noncommercial speech).
208. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *63 (weighing protecting
consumers and protecting free speech).
209. See Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1231 (Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that misleading statements in promotional materials on
jacket of book were unprotected commercial speech). But see Lacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d
at 183  (holding that statements advertising book as how-to investment guide were
protected noncommercial speech).
210. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *42 (citing Dex Media W.,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012)) (describing inextricable
intertwinement test and explaining source of analysis for commercial speech in
Ninth Circuit).
211. See id. at *50-51 (“Given that the speech does more than propose a com-
mercial transaction, the Court must consider whether the speech contains mixed
content—that is, both commercial and non-commercial elements.” (quoting Dex
Media, 696 F.3d at 957)).
212. See id. at *46-57 (analyzing categories of speech).  The Stutzman court
quoted Keimer when discussing the content of the books and noted that in Keimer’s
holding, the statements made in promotional materials were unprotected com-
mercial speech. See id. at *46 (citing Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1231).  However,
upon turning to the discussion of the promotional materials on the books, where
Keimer’s holding is most relevant, the court instead discussed Keimer’s companion
case—a New York state court case that addressed the same factual findings as
Keimer, but held the opposite way. See id. at *62-63 (citing Lacoff, 705 N.Y.S.2d at
183 (holding that statements advertising book as how-to investment guide were
protected noncommercial speech)). See generally Katze, supra note 110, at 17 (ex-
plaining commercial speech doctrine with respect to scandal regarding sale of
James Frey’s book A Million Little Pieces as memoir when it was exposed as
fabricated).
213. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 11 (explaining lawsuit against Frey over book).
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Despite the precedent and policy in favor of protecting con-
sumers, these plaintiffs faced a comparatively steeper obstacle with
the Anti-SLAPP motion.214  Given that Lance Armstrong’s telling of
his life concerns a matter of general concern, and the burden-shift-
ing the SLAPP motion provides, the SLAPP analysis did properly
expose the meritless nature of the claims.215
VI. IMPACT
The decision in Stutzman exposes two notable points regarding,
first, the diminished power of consumer laws when free speech is a
concern and, second, where SLAPP litigation is headed.216  While
this lawsuit may have turned out to be meritless, its analysis further
closes the door to the courts for disgruntled readers and leaves
open the window for wide use of SLAPP motions.217
First, while there is already settled precedent regarding the
content of books, courts are in disagreement about how to treat
promotional statements about books that contain statements made
within the books.218  Rather than following California’s precedent
in Keimer, the Eastern District applied a newer test developed by the
Ninth Circuit in Dex Media.219  This decision disregarded the hold-
ing in Keimer that advertisements on book covers were unprotected
214. Compare Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *46-57 (granting De-
fendants’ anti-SLAPP motion), and Keimer, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1231 (implying that
Anti-SLAPP motion was not available as it was not used in case), with Lacoff, 705
N.Y.S.2d at 183 (implying that Anti-SLAPP motion not applicable to case). But see
Pfau v. Mortenson, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1162 (D. Mont. 2012), aff’d, 542 F. App’x
557 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that plaintiffs could not prove publishers should be
held liable).  Defendant-publishers in Pfau prevailed even without using the anti-
SLAPP law, as it is not available in Montana. See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protec-
tion/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (listing states that have anti-SLAPP laws).
215. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *18 (finding that Arm-
strong is “without question” person of public interest). See also Bill Analysis Hearing,
supra note 15  (statement of Senator Kuehl regarding Anti-SLAPP statute as tool
against meritless suits).  For a discussion what qualifies as “public interest” see
supra notes 137-140.
216. See infra notes 216-241 and accompanying text (explaining future of
SLAPP laws).
217. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *54-55 (holding that book
advertisements were inextricably intertwined with protected speech and therefore
protected; permitting Anti-SLAPP motion by use of publishing companies and
Lance Armstrong).
218. See, e.g., Katze, supra note 110, at 221 (explaining commercial speech
doctrine with respect to scandal regarding sale of James Frey’s book A Million Little
Pieces as memoir when it was exposed as fabricated).
219. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *51 (citing Dex Media W.,
Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012)) (applying inextricable
intertwinement test).
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commercial speech, in favor of the policy that suggests that promo-
tional materials about books can simply not be separated from the
books themselves.220  As a result, even though Armstrong and his
publishers did substantially profit from his lies, the advertisements
of those protected lies were likewise safeguarded.221  Although this
opinion does not really address Keimer, it will be much harder to
reconcile the two opinions in the future.222  Likewise, while Stutz-
man serves the purpose of protecting publishers from the vast bur-
den of having to verify every book advertised as a memoir, after this
decision, consumers will find it difficult to buy into a heroic tale.223
Second, the opinion in Stutzman highlighted the way in which
SLAPP laws have evolved and where they are headed in the fu-
220. See id. (explaining that the court must analyze “whether the speech con-
tains mixed content,” i.e. both commercial and non-commercial content (citing
Dex Media W., 696 F.3d at 957)). The court noted the following:
To this end, although Plaintiffs assert that the public interest in this case
weighs in favor of protecting consumers from books that contain false
statements, the case law makes clear that the public interest swings in the
opposite direction, towards closely guarding the right to free speech and
the free flow of ideas that the First Amendment seeks to protect.
Id. at *63 (discussing public policy arguments).  But see Katze, supra note 110, at
223 (explaining protections and limits on protections afforded commercial speech
(citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980)).  Recall that, in Central Hudson, the Supreme Court provided a
four-part test regarding misleading commercial speech and that the following lan-
guage describes the Court’s analysis under this test:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within the provi-
sion, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next,
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both
inquires yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regula-
tion directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it
is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (discussing four-part analysis). In California,
consumer protection laws were enacted specifically with a strong interest to pro-
vide misled consumers an outlet. See THOMAS A. PAPAGEORGE & ROBERT C.
FELLMETH, 1-2 CAL. WHITE COLLAR CRIME AND BUS. LITIGATION, § 3.2 (2013) (“Sec-
tion 17500 [California’s Unfair Competition Law] has been consistently upheld as
a valid constitutional exercise of the state’s police power regulatory authority”).
However, California has reformed consumer protection laws to ensure they are not
misused for frivolous suits. See generally Leviant, supra note 60.
221. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *55 (granting anti-SLAPP
motion for defendants).
222. Compare id. at *54-55 (holding that promotional materials of books are
protected speech), with Keimer v. Buena Vista Books, Inc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1220,
1231 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that promotion materials of books were unpro-
tected commercial speech).
223. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *56-57 (citing Greenspan
v.  Random House, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 206, 220 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d No. 12-
1594, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22285 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2012)) (holding that publish-
ers are not required to fact check memoirs). See also Grinberg, supra note 4 (not-
ing that fans called Armstrong “face of hope”).
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ture.224  This case confirms that SLAPP laws have transformed from
their origins.225  SLAPP motions have the primary purpose of de-
tecting meritless suits that, at least originally, more economically
powerful parties brought to silence the underdogs.226  In Califor-
nia, the legislature specifically noted concerns that corporations
were abusing the Anti-SLAPP motion.227  Here, Lance Armstrong,
his management team, and his publishers are hardly underdogs;
they are rather wealthy individuals and large corporations, who re-
lied on the motion to defeat claims that Armstrong profited from
lies he told.228  This exposes an important truth: Anti-SLAPP mo-
tions are available now more than ever, despite reforms.229
On the other hand, the Anti-SLAPP motion did here what it
was designed to do—it exposed the Stutzman suit as meritless
claim.230  Certainly, consumers and admirers were dismayed to
learn that their inspiration, Lance Armstrong, was a fraud.231  How-
ever, if Americans were entitled to sue for every time an idolized
celebrity fell from grace, the judicial system would be even more
backlogged than it already is.232  While Lance Armstrong deserved
224. See generally Braun, supra note 18, at 970 (noting use of SLAPP laws by
persons faced with suit brought by larger corporation).
225. Accord FAQs About SLAPPs, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www
.anti-slapp.org/slappdash-faqs-about-slapps/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2014) (listing
states that have anti-SLAPP laws).
226. See generally Braun, supra note 18, at 970 (noting purpose of SLAPP laws).
227. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (noting that Consumers Attorneys
of California sponsored legislative reforms to stop corporate abuse of the statute
and return it to its original purpose of protecting citizen’s rights of petition).
228. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *66 (holding that SLAPP
motion dismissed claims for fraud against Armstrong and publishers).
229. See PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, supra note 225 (explaining who can
use SLAPP laws).
230. See Bill Analysis Hearing, supra note 15 (statement of Senator Kuehl re-
garding anti-SLAPP statute as tool against meritless suits).
231. See Marcur, supra note 3 (describing Armstrong interview and alleging
that interview did little to salvage reputation).  In reference to Armstrong’s inter-
view with Oprah, New York Times writer Marcur, who also personally knew Arm-
strong, notes the betrayal that people felt after his interview, writing that
“Armstrong failed to offer his fans what they were seeking: genuine contrition.” See
id.
232. See The Risk in Making Sports Stars “Heroes” (CBS News website broadcast
Jan. 19, 2013), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/the-risk-in-making-
sports-stars-heroes/ (broadcasting discussion between Jim Axelrod and New York
Times sports columnist William Rhoden about potential problems that arise when
people idolize sports figures).  During the discussion, Mr. Rhoden notes the fol-
lowing about sports figures in the United States:
 [Americans] are always looking for people and things that . . . express
the . . . great possibilities. . . .  And sports is a great metaphor for that. . . .
[because in sports [t]here are heroic moments. . . .  But . . . [we] take that
leap from [heroic moments in sports] and make that an existence.  We
38
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to be punished for his actions, challenging his First Amendment
right was not necessarily the best means to do so.233
VII. CONCLUSION
Readers and fans instituted this case when they felt betrayed by
their hero’s actions.234  They were not the first; other authors have
been subjected to similar suits when their mesmerizing memoirs
were exposed as fabrications.235  Lance Armstrong was truly an in-
spiration and a “face of hope[;]” he beat the cancer odds only to
pedal his way into cycling history.236  With the American tendency
toward elevating athletes to hero status, it is not surprising people
bought his story.237  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has protected
one’s right to lie as one of the rights protected under the large free
speech umbrella.238  Now, the District Court of Eastern California
in Stutzman has taken this one-step further, and joined the pack of
jurisdictions that protect the promotional statements that sell pro-
tected lies.239
make that the person and then we become disappointed to find out.
Guess what, this guy is just like me.
Id. (discussing difficulty of differentiating heroic acts and heroes).  As Rhoden dis-
cusses the list of disgraced professional athletes, he notes this danger in associating
the heroic act with the human who is imperfect. See id.
233. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing Armstrong admitting
wrongdoing during interview with Oprah).  But recall that, in reference to Arm-
strong’s interview with Oprah, New York Times writer Juliet Marcur, who person-
ally knew Armstrong, notes the betrayal that people felt after the interview: “. . .
Armstrong failed to offer his fans what they were seeking: genuine contrition.” See
Marcur, supra note 3.
234. See Stutzman v. Armstrong, No. 2:13-CV-00116-MCE-KJN, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 129204, at *10 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 2013) (noting that plaintiff Lauria
claimed to be “bitterly angry” after learning about Armstrong’s drug use (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See Grinberg, supra note 4 (describ-
ing backlash of people who supported Armstrong’s foundation LIVESTRONG).
235. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text (discussing similar appli-
cation of SLAPP laws in high profile fraud cases against authors).
236. See Grinberg, supra note 4 (describing backlash of people who supported
Armstrong’s foundation LIVESTRONG).  Armstrong’s cancer foundation, Lives-
trong, was hugely successful thanks to the yellow Livestrong bracelet campaign. See
Grinberg, supra note 4. Although criticized for using the foundation as a shield
against his doping allegations, supporters “bought bracelets for more strength, for
unity, and suddenly Lance wasn’t just an athlete any longer . . . .  Lance [was]
Livestrong, he [was] the face of hope.” See Grinberg, supra note 4.
237. See The Risk in Making Sports Stars “Heroes” (CBS News website broadcast
Jan. 19, 2013), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/the-risk-in-making-
sports-stars-heroes/ (discussing issue with idolizing public sports figures).
238. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (noting that
there is genuine usefulness to free speech jurisprudence by protecting one’s right
to lie).
239. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *47-48 (“[T]he Court con-
cludes, despite Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Armstrong Books contained false and
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Given the purpose of the Anti-SLAPP statutes and the strong
policy concerns in favor of protecting free speech, the court was not
wrong in dismissing the suit.240  Nonetheless, this case does unfor-
tunately expose an important lesson: before you buy into a story
that seems too good to be true, remember that you cannot always
believe what you read.241
Anna Haslinsky*
misleading statements, that the content of the Books is afforded full First Amend-
ment protection.”); Katze, supra note 110, at 221 (explaining commercial speech
doctrine with respect to scandal regarding sale of James Frey’s book A Million Little
Pieces as memoir when it was exposed as fabricated).
240. See Stutzman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129204, at *23-25 (holding that
plaintiffs could not show probability of success to survive Anti-SLAPP motion).
241. See Katze, supra note 110, at 221 (observing in reference to James Frey
memoir scandal, one attorney remarked, “I’ve just come to assume that anything
published under the memoir label in the twenty-first century is the modern-day
equivalent of a Philip Roth novel that isn’t well-written enough to be successfully
marketed as fiction” (quoting Ted Frank, A Million Little Plaintiffs, OVERLAWYERED
(Jan. 12, 2006), http://overlawyered.com/2006/01/a-million-little-plaintiffs/)).
* J.D. Candidate, Villanova University School of Law, 2015; B.A., Roanoke
College, 2011.
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